After I wrote my recent blog post entitled MODEL RAILWAYS, MINI-CAMPAIGNS ... AND THE GHOST OF AN IDEA I remembered the plot of Antoine Vanner's most recent book in the DAWLISH CHRONICLE, BRITANNIA'S BLUFF.
The plot of the book revolves around an attempt to draw Turkish attention away from Gallipoli in the run up to the Allied evacuation and involves a landing and temporary occupation of part of the Turkish coast in the Gulf of Alexandretta.
The main means of communication in the area is a railway line, and it plays an important role in the defence of the landing area.
Now, this would make another excellent railway-based mini-campaign, as the maps from the book show.
Notes
In the book, the two redoubts (Wellington and Marlborough) were constructed by the landing force and were served and supported by the railway. They were intended to be the outer defences for the landing area at Alexandretta.
The defensive Clapham Perimeter around Toprakkale Junction was constructed by the landing force to protect its improvised airfield and the local railway depot. It was also the base for an extemporised railway gun.
The Turkish force that was sent to attack the landing area comes from the direction of Ceyhan.
So, this is yet another ghost of an idea that may never come to fruition ... but it certainly has the sort of potential that makes it worth investigating further!
BRITANNIA’S BLUFF: THE DAWLISH CHRONICLES: NOVEMBER 1915 – JANUARY 1916 was written by Antoine Vanner and published in 2025 by Old Salt Press (ISBN 9781 943 40470 4) and can be purchased via Amazon in paperback or Kindle editions.



That is a really interesting idea. The rail line makes this a great point-to-point map system.
ReplyDeleteWith the last few map related posts I'm wonder, are you reading my mind?
WEK 3,
DeleteIf one looks at warfare from the middle of the nineteenth century until the middle of the last ... and even up to the modern day, railways are THE method of transporting large numbers of men and their equipment across country. As a result, I think that they really ought to feature far more in wargames.
All the best,
Bob
An interesting idea. Might be a good candidate for a Dominion mini campaign to get it on the table quickly and easily. I think Dominion of the Red and White would handle it very well.
ReplyDeleteMark Cordone,
DeleteThat's an excellent idea! I'm going to be very busy over the next few days, but I'll have a look at your idea in greater depth next week.
All the best,
Bob
Interesting plot for a campaign, but it's also an interesting line map for a model railway.
ReplyDeleteThere was an actual Royal Navy operation off Alexandretta in winter 1914-15, summarised by Colonel Edward Erickson (retd) in an article, "Captain Larkin and the Turks: the strategic impact of the operations of HMS Doris in Early 1915", published in the journal Middle Eastern Studies 46:1 (January 2010). Its abstract reads: "The voyages of the [light cruiser] HMS Doris along the Mediterranean coast near Alexandretta... in the winter of 1914–15 had a dramatic effect on the Ottoman Empire that far exceeded the scope of the operations. This article uses British, German, and Turkish archival sources to focus on the ship's operations in the vicinity of Dörtyol and on the strategic impact these had on Ottoman perceptions of threats to the empire. The Doris figures prominently in two critical strategic outcomes – the relocation of the Armenians in 1915 and in the activation of three Ottoman army divisions for coastal defence and internal security."
ReplyDeleteThere is a wider issue, of course: if the Allies had directed the forces used in the Dardanelles campaign (where they attacked one of only two places in the whole Ottoman Empire with significant coastal defences, the other being the Bosphorus) against the Alexandretta area (where Ottoman forces were modest) they'd have had a far easier time -- and would have been able to disrupt the only major Ottoman rail link that supplied their Mesopotamia and Syria-Palestine fronts. (The other significant Ottoman front, against the Russian in the Caucasus, had no rail link at all on the Ottoman side, so reinforcements could generally only arrive by long and laborious road routes, or take a major risk by trying to cross the Black Sea in the face of a superior Russian fleet.)