Yesterday I gave a lecture to High Barnet Masters Lodge about the Halsey family of Hertfordshire. They effectively ran Freemasonry in Hertfordshire for the best part of one hundred years and their role is commemorated by the fact that several lodges have been named after members of the family and two Masonic Centres are called Halsey Hall.
Whilst researching the family's history I discovered that they were distantly related to the family of Admiral William Halsey Jnr., who was a leading proponents of carrier warfare and one of the US fleet commanders during the Pacific War. I wanted to find out more about Bill (or as the newspapers named him, Bull) Halsey's career, but I had difficulty finding an affordable copy of a biography. At this point the Naval Institute Press stepped in to help, and they kindly sent me a copy of BULL HALSEY by E B Potter (ISBN 1 59114 691 7).
This book was originally published in 1985 and was printed in paperback format by the NIP in 2002. Having read it, I came away with the feeling that this was no hagiography; this was a genuine 'warts and all' biography. It struck me as being a very honest portrait of a man who had flaws, but who was very much the right man for the job that was required at the time. He certainly made mistakes – for example his actions during the Battle of Leyte Gulf were certainly controversial and have exercised the minds of many naval historians and tacticians ever since – but it must be remembered that for much of the war he suffered from a debilitating skin complaint that would have laid up many other commanders for far longer than Halsey was. He was certainly a man of action and an aggressive commander (hence the nickname Bull), and as the war progressed he may well have begun to believe in the media legend that was created around him, and this might have cause him to make some of his poorer decisions. That said, he seems to have had the ability to inspire others, and his order that naval officers in the South Pacific should no longer wear ties with their uniforms is an example of a simple and evocative gesture that showed that the men under his command were getting ready for a fight.
The chapter that deals with the Battle of Leyte Gulf is – in my opinion – the most useful explanation I have read about Admiral Halsey’s actions during the battle and points out the problems that arise when command hierarchies impose restrictions that not only slow down the ability of commanders to communicate with one another, but impede them. General MacArthur’s insistence that communications from Admiral Kincaid to Admiral Halsey should go indirectly via the radio station at Manus and not directly to preserve the separate and independent of his – MacArthur’s – command strikes one as a recipe for a potential disaster. It says much for Admiral Kincaid that he ensured that he and his staff were unofficially listening in to Halsey’s communications with his fleet and were therefore better aware of the developing situation than they otherwise would have been.
With hindsight it is easy to say that Admiral Halsey misread the situation he was facing and that this almost led to a disaster … but this chapter shows that he was not being kept fully aware of events elsewhere in the area around Leyte Gulf, and that some of the messages he received were delivered out of chronological order and in one case containing ‘padding’* that resulted in the Admiral suffering a serious but temporary demoralisation at a crucial point in the battle. I was left with the feeling that in view of the options open to him, Admiral Halsey made the best decisions that he could
I thoroughly recommend this book ... if you can get hold of a copy!
* Padding was nonsense phrases added to the beginning and end of coded messages to help prevent decryption. In this instance a message from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral Halsey read ‘WHERE RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS.’ This seemed to be a very public rebuke from his superior (the message was copied to the other Fleet Commanders) to Admiral Halsey … but the latter part of the message – the part that momentarily stunned him – was merely padding that should have been removed. The message as dictated was ‘WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR .’ This was merely a request for information, but it shows the dangers that can arise when the clarity of communications between commanders are not as good as it should be.
Whilst researching the family's history I discovered that they were distantly related to the family of Admiral William Halsey Jnr., who was a leading proponents of carrier warfare and one of the US fleet commanders during the Pacific War. I wanted to find out more about Bill (or as the newspapers named him, Bull) Halsey's career, but I had difficulty finding an affordable copy of a biography. At this point the Naval Institute Press stepped in to help, and they kindly sent me a copy of BULL HALSEY by E B Potter (ISBN 1 59114 691 7).
This book was originally published in 1985 and was printed in paperback format by the NIP in 2002. Having read it, I came away with the feeling that this was no hagiography; this was a genuine 'warts and all' biography. It struck me as being a very honest portrait of a man who had flaws, but who was very much the right man for the job that was required at the time. He certainly made mistakes – for example his actions during the Battle of Leyte Gulf were certainly controversial and have exercised the minds of many naval historians and tacticians ever since – but it must be remembered that for much of the war he suffered from a debilitating skin complaint that would have laid up many other commanders for far longer than Halsey was. He was certainly a man of action and an aggressive commander (hence the nickname Bull), and as the war progressed he may well have begun to believe in the media legend that was created around him, and this might have cause him to make some of his poorer decisions. That said, he seems to have had the ability to inspire others, and his order that naval officers in the South Pacific should no longer wear ties with their uniforms is an example of a simple and evocative gesture that showed that the men under his command were getting ready for a fight.
The chapter that deals with the Battle of Leyte Gulf is – in my opinion – the most useful explanation I have read about Admiral Halsey’s actions during the battle and points out the problems that arise when command hierarchies impose restrictions that not only slow down the ability of commanders to communicate with one another, but impede them. General MacArthur’s insistence that communications from Admiral Kincaid to Admiral Halsey should go indirectly via the radio station at Manus and not directly to preserve the separate and independent of his – MacArthur’s – command strikes one as a recipe for a potential disaster. It says much for Admiral Kincaid that he ensured that he and his staff were unofficially listening in to Halsey’s communications with his fleet and were therefore better aware of the developing situation than they otherwise would have been.
With hindsight it is easy to say that Admiral Halsey misread the situation he was facing and that this almost led to a disaster … but this chapter shows that he was not being kept fully aware of events elsewhere in the area around Leyte Gulf, and that some of the messages he received were delivered out of chronological order and in one case containing ‘padding’* that resulted in the Admiral suffering a serious but temporary demoralisation at a crucial point in the battle. I was left with the feeling that in view of the options open to him, Admiral Halsey made the best decisions that he could
I thoroughly recommend this book ... if you can get hold of a copy!
* Padding was nonsense phrases added to the beginning and end of coded messages to help prevent decryption. In this instance a message from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral Halsey read ‘WHERE RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS.’ This seemed to be a very public rebuke from his superior (the message was copied to the other Fleet Commanders) to Admiral Halsey … but the latter part of the message – the part that momentarily stunned him – was merely padding that should have been removed. The message as dictated was ‘WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR .’ This was merely a request for information, but it shows the dangers that can arise when the clarity of communications between commanders are not as good as it should be.
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My impression is that there are plenty of second hand copies around - in both UK and the USA - if you are prepared to buy from AbeBooks or Amazon marketplace. Your review tempts me but I've owned - and mostly got rid of - too many books on WWII in the Pacific to justify new purchases (at least of physical books - shelf space is still far too crowded despite multiple disposals, though if the Kindle version was not overpriced I'd probably buy it as those electrons take up so little space).
ReplyDeleteMike Hall,
DeleteSome of the prices being asked for second-hand copies of this book are ridiculously high, and I was extremely lucky to get one from NIP.
Bearing in mind the ease with which books can be digitised, the price of the electronic version of this book does not reflect that.
All the best,
Bob
Thanks for that review Bob. So many books, so little time.
ReplyDeleteConrad Kinch,
DeleteThis book certainly gave me a better understanding of the reasoning behind some of the actions Admiral Halsey took at various times during the Pacific War, and I am glad that you found my review interesting enough to think about reading this book at some time.
All the best,
Bob